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Abstract
We consider two versions of a Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric costs and homo-
geneous goods. They differ in whether predatory pricing is allowed. For each version,
we derive the Myopic Stable Set in pure strategies as introduced by Demuynck, Her-
ings, Saulle, and Seel (2017). We contrast our prediction to the prediction of Nash
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1 Introduction
The analysis of price competition is a fundamental part of oligopoly theory since Bertrand’s
contribution (Bertrand, 1883). The Bertrand duopoly with symmetric constant marginal
costs, homogeneous goods and continuous prices has a unique Nash Equilibrium characterized
by a strategy profile in which prices equal marginal costs.
If marginal costs are not symmetric across firms and the market is shared if firms set
equal prices, no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Blume (2003) shows that there exists
a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies where the more efficient firm sets price equal to
the opponent’s marginal cost and serves the entire market with probability 1. The rival
randomizes uniformly on an interval above his marginal cost. Kartik (2011) strengthens this
result by showing that all undominated equilibria have the same outcome in terms of market
price and shares. When dominated strategies are allowed, no such result is known.
In this paper, we analyze two versions of the same Bertrand game, one in which predatory
pricing (i.e. setting prices below marginal costs) is allowed and one in which predatory pricing
is forbidden. Predatory prices correspond to dominated strategies. We use a solution concept
recently introduced by Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2017), the Myopic Stable Set.
A set of strategy profiles is myopically stable if it satisfies three conditions, deterrence of
external deviations, asymptotic external stability and minimality. Deterrence of external
deviations requires that no player benefits by switching her strategy such that the resulting
strategy profile is outside the Myopic Stable Set. Asymptotic external stability makes sure
that from any strategy profile outside the set it is possible to get arbitrarily close to a
strategy profile inside the Myopic Stable Set by a sequence of better replies. The final
condition, minimality, requires that the Myopic Stable Set is minimal with respect to set
inclusion.
In Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2017) we defined the Myopic Stable Set for a
very general class of social environments (Chwe, 1994) that allows for infinite state spaces
and includes normal-form games as a special case. We proved that if the state space is
compact then the myopic stable set exists and under some mild continuity assumptions it is
also unique. Moreover, we showed that the Myopic Stable Set coincides with the set of pure
strategy Nash Equilibria for supermodular games, aggregative games and potential games.
In light of these results, the Bertrand model with asymmetric costs is interesting for
several reasons: it does not satisfy the compactness and continuity assumptions of Demuynck,
Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2017), it does not belong to any of the aforementioned classes of
games and the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game is empty.
We prove existence and uniqueness of the Myopic Stable Set for asymmetric Bertrand
competition and characterize the set, both when predatory pricing is allowed and when it is
forbidden.
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2 Model and Solution Concept
In this section, we define the myopic stable set for normal-form gamesG : pN, pSiqiPN , ppiiqiPNq,
where N  t1, ..., nu is a finite set of players with typical element i, Si is the set of strategies
for each player i P N and pii :

iPN Si Ñ R is the payoff function of player i. Denote the
strategy space by S 

iPN Si  Rn. We use the standard notation s : psi, siq P S
to denote the strategy profile where si is the list of strategies of all players except i, i.e.,
si : psjqjPNztiu.
We say that a strategy profile s1 P S dominates another strategy profile s P S if there
is a player who can unilaterally deviate to s1 and strictly prefers s1 over s, i.e., from s, the
player has a better reply such that the resulting strategy profile is s1.
Definition 1 (Dominance). Let s, s1 P S be two strategy profiles. The strategy profile s1
dominates s if there exists a player i P N such that piips
1q ¡ piipsq and s
1
i  si.
Let some strategy profile s P S be given. The set of all strategy profiles that dominates
s together with s itself is denoted by fpsq,
fpsq  tsu Y ts1 P S|s1 dominates su.
We define the two-fold composition of f by
f 2psq  ts2 P S|Ds1 P S : s1 P fpsq and s2 P fps1qu.
By induction, for k ¥ 3, we can define the k-fold composition fkpsq by sk P fkpsq if there is
sk1 P fk1psq such that sk P fpsk1q. Observe that for all k, ` P N such that k ¤ ` it holds
that fkpsq  f `psq. We define the set of all strategy profiles that can be reached from s by
a finite number of dominations by fNpsq, where
fNpsq :

kPNf
kpsq.
Given s, s1 P S, we say that a strategy profile s1 asymptotically dominates s if starting from
s, it is possible to get arbitrarily close to s1 in a finite number of dominations. Let dps, s1q
denote the Euclidean distance between s and s1. The asymptotic dominance criterion is
formally defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Asymptotic Dominance). A strategy profile s8 P S asymptotically dominates
s P S if for all ε ¡ 0 there exists s1 P fNpsq such that dps8, s1q   ε.
We denote the set of all strategy profiles in S that asymptotically dominate s by f8psq.
Formally,
f8psq  ts8 P S|@ε ¡ 0, Ds1 P fNpsq : dps8, s1q   εu.
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It is easy to see that the set f8psq coincides with the closure of the set fNpsq. We are now
ready to define the Myopic Stable Set, abbreviated as MSS, for normal-form games.
Definition 3 (Myopic Stable Set (MSS)). Let G : pN, pSiqiPN , ppiiqiPNq be a normal-form
game. The set M  S is a myopic stable set (MSS) if it is closed and satisfies the following
three conditions:
1. Deterrence of external deviations: For all s PM , fpsq M .
2. Asymptotic external stability: For all s RM, f8psq XM  H.
3. Minimality: There is no closed set M 1 M that satisfies Conditions 1 and 2.
Let M be a MSS. Deterrence of external deviations requires that no player can profitably
deviate to a strategy profile outside M . Asymptotic external stability requires that any
strategy profile outside M is asymptotically dominated by a strategy profile in M . Hence,
from any strategy profile outside of M it is possible to get arbitrary close to a strategy profile
in M by a finite number of dominations. Observe that an empty set would necessarily violate
asymptotic external stability, so it follows that M is non-empty.
3 Bertrand Duopoly with Asymmetric Costs
Consider a model with two firms, N  t1, 2u, having constant marginal costs 0 ¤ c1   c2
and no fixed costs. The strategy space Pi of a firm i P N consists of all non-negative prices,
i.e., Pi  r0,8q. Define P : P1  P2 with typical element p.
The continuous market demand function D : r0,8q ÝÑ R  expresses the demand for
the good as a function of the lowest price pm available in the market. There exists a “choke”
price pm P pc2,8q such that Dppmq  0 for all pm ¥ pm. The demand is strictly decreasing
on r0, pms and zero on rpm,8q. We assume that there is an ε ¡ 0 such that the profits
ppm  c1qDppmq of a monopolist with marginal costs c1 are strictly increasing in pm on the
domain rc1, c2   εs. This assumption ensures an element of competition between the firms.
If the profits of the monopolist with marginal costs c1 has a maximum for a price in rc1, c2q,
then the strategy profiles in which Firm 1 chooses this price and Firm 2 chooses a strictly
higher price are Nash equilibria and part of the MSS.
For each firm i P t1, 2u, its individual demand depends on its price pi and the price of its
competitor j  i and is given by:
Qippi, pjq 
$'&
'%
Dppiq if pi   pj,
Dppiq{2 if pi  pj,
0 if pi ¡ pj.
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Thus, the firm setting the lower price serves the entire market. In case of a tie, the
market share of each firm equals 1{2. For each firm i P t1, 2u, the demand Qippi, pjq leads to
a payoff function pii : P1  P2 ÝÑ R defined by piippi, pjq  ppi  ciqQippi, pjq.
The normal-form game pt1, 2u, pPiqiPt1,2u, ppiiqiPt1,2uq is denoted by Γ.
3.1 No Legal Restrictions
The next result characterizes the unique MSS of the game. The set is illustrated as the
shaded area in the left panel of Figure 1.
Proposition 4. The unique MSS of Γ is given by:
P   tp P P |c1 ¤ p1 ¤ pm and p1 ¤ p2u Y tp P P |c2 ¤ p2 ¤ p1 ¤ pmu.
Proof. Let M be an MSS.
Step 1. P 1  tp P P |c1 ¤ p1  p2 ¤ c2u M.
Towards a contradiction, suppose that pp1, p2q P P satisfies c1   p1  p2   c2 and
pp1, p2q is not in M . Once the contradiction is obtained, we get the result of Step 1
exploiting the fact that M is closed.
Take some p11 P pc1, p1q and suppose that pp
1
1, p2q P M . Given that pp1, p2q R M and
M is closed, there is an ε1 ¡ 0 such that for every ε P p0, ε1q we have pp1  ε, p2q R M .
However, for every ε P p0, ε1q, as the profits of a monopolist with marginal costs c1
are strictly increasing on the domain rc1, c2s, Firm 1 will find it profitable to deviate
to p1  ε ¡ p
1. Since M satisfies deterrence of external deviations, it follows that
pp1  ε, p2q P M , leading to a contradiction. Consequently, it follows that for every
p11 P pc1, p1q, pp
1
1, p2q RM.
Take some p11 P pc1, p1q such that pi1pp
1
1, p2q ¡ pi1pp1, p2q{2. It holds by the conclusion of
the previous paragraph that pp11, p2q RM. By asymptotic external stability, there must
be pp21, p
2
2q P M such that pp
2
1, p
2
2q P f
8pp11, p2q. Note that any profitable deviation of
Firm 1 from pp11, p2q is to a strategy profile pp˜1, p2q such that p˜1 P pp
1
1, p1q. In any of
these profiles, Firm 2 makes no sales and has no profitable deviation. Since none of
these profiles is in M , by asymptotic external stability it holds that pp1, p2q P M , a
contradiction.
Step 2. P 2  tp P P |c1 ¤ p1 ¤ c2, p1 ¤ p2u M.
Take pp1, p2q P P
1 such that p2   c2. It follows from Step 1 that pp1, p2q P M. It holds
that pi2pp1, p2q is strictly negative. As such, Firm 2 can gain by increasing p2 to any
value above p1 resulting in a profit of zero. By deterrence of external deviations, all of
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these options must also be in M. The result of Step 2 now follows from the requirement
that M is closed.
Step 3. P 3  tp P P |c2 ¤ p1 ¤ pm, p1 ¤ p2u M.
Take pp1, p2q P P
2 such that c1  p1   p2. By Step 2 it holds that pp1, p2q P M .
The profits of Firm 1 are equal to 0. Then Firm 1 can deviate and increase profits
by choosing p11 such that p1   p
1
1   pm and p
1
1   p2. Since M satisfies deterrence of
external deviations, it holds that pp11, p2q P M . Using closedness of M we can again
change strict inequalities to weak inequalities.
Step 4. P 4  tp P P |c2 ¤ p2 ¤ p1 ¤ pmu M.
Take pp1, p2q P P
3 such that c2   p1   pm and p1   p2. By Step 3 it holds that
pp1, p2q PM . The profits of Firm 2 are equal to 0. Now Firm 2 can deviate and set p
1
2
such that c2   p
1
2   p1 and make strictly positive profits. Again, the result of Step 4
follows by deterrence of external deviations and closedness of M .
Step 5. P 2 Y P 3 Y P 4  P  is the unique MSS.
First, observe that P  is closed. We have shown that P  is contained in any MSS,
so we only need to show that P  itself satisfies deterrence of external deviations and
asymptotic external stability. The set P zP  is given by
tp P P |p1 ¤ p2, p1   c1uloooooooooooooomoooooooooooooon
P 5
Y tp P P |p1 ¡ p2, p2   c2uloooooooooooooomoooooooooooooon
P 6
Y tp P P |p1 ¡ pm, p2 ¥ c2uloooooooooooooomoooooooooooooon
P 7
.
In order to see that P  satisfies deterrence of external deviations, note that Firm 1
makes non-negative profits at any strategy profile in P  and non-positive profits at
any profile in P zP . Thus, Firm 1 will never deviate from a strategy profile in P 
to a strategy profile in P zP . Next, Firm 2 cannot deviate to any strategy profile in
P 5YP 7 from any strategy profile in P . Finally, at any strategy profile in P 6, Firm 2
has negative profits. Firm 2 only obtains negative profits at strategy profiles in P  if
p1  p2   c2. In these cases, if Firm 2 deviates to a profile in P
6 by choosing p12   p1,
its profits decrease. Thus, Firm 2 will not make such a deviation.
It remains to be shown that P  satisfies asymptotic external stability. At any strategy
profile in P 5, Firm 1 has a negative profit and the deviation to pc1, p2q is thus profitable
for Firm 1. If p2 ¥ c1 then pc1, p2q P P
, otherwise Firm 2 can gain by deviating to
pc1, c2q P P
. In P 6, Firm 2 has a negative profit and the deviation to pp1, c2q is
profitable for Firm 2. If p1 ¥ c1 then pp1, c2q P P
. Otherwise, there exists a profitable
deviation of Firm 1 to pc1, c2q P P
. In P 7, Firm 1 has a profit of at most zero. Thus,
the deviation to the profile ppc1   c2q{2, p2q P P
 is profitable for Firm 1.
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Figure 1: The MSS for the asymmetric Bertrand model. Left panel: without legal restric-
tions. Right panel: with legal restrictions.
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3.2 Legal Restrictions on Predatory Pricing
Let us now consider a slightly different version of Bertrand competition. In many countries,
pricing below marginal or average cost is considered to be predatory pricing and is thus
forbidden by law. We analyze how this restriction influences the MSS. To do so, we adjust
the sets of strategies and define
P˜1  tp1 P P1|p1 ¥ c1u,
P˜2  tp2 P P2|p2 ¥ c2u,
and P˜  P˜1  P˜2.
The absence of predatory pricing is similar to the requirement of undominated strategies
in Kartik (2011). The only difference is that pricing at marginal costs is allowed in our setting,
while it is ruled out in Kartik (2011). The normal-form game pt1, 2u, pP˜iqiPt1,2u, ppiiqiPt1,2uq is
denoted by Γ˜.
The following proposition shows that the MSS gets much smaller under legal restrictions
on predatory pricing. Let p
1
P pc1, c2q be the uniquely determined price such that pi1pp1, c2q 
pi1pc2, c2q.
Proposition 5. The unique MSS of Γ˜ is given by
P˜  
!
pp1, p2q P P˜
pi1pp1, c2q ¥ pi1pc2, c2q, p2  c2
)
 rp
1
, c2s  tc2u.
Proof. We split the proof into several steps.
Step 1. We show that P˜  satisfies deterrence of external deviations and asymptotic external
stability. We start with deterrence of external deviations. For pp1, c2q P P˜
, profits of
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Firm 1 are greater than or equal to pi1pc2, c2q. For p1 R rp1, c2s, profits are pi1pp1, c2q  
pi1pc2, c2q. Thus, for any state in P˜
, player 1 will not deviate to a state in P˜ zP˜ . Firm
2 makes zero profits for any point in P˜  and non-positive profits for any p2 P P˜2 if
p1 ¤ c2. Thus, Firm 2 has no profitable deviation. This shows deterrence of external
deviations for P˜ .
It remains to verify asymptotic external stability. Let some pp1, p2q P P˜ zP˜
 be given.
If c2   p1   p2, then Firm 2 can profitably deviate to p
1
2  pc2   mintp1, pmuq{2 and
Firm 1 can profitably deviate in the next step to p11  pc2   p
1
2q{2 and so forth. It
follows that pc2, c2q P f
8pp1, p2q X P˜
. If p1 ¤ c2   p2, then Firm 1 can profitably
deviate to pp11, p2q, where p
1
1 P pc2, p2q is chosen such that p
1
1   c2   ε with ε ¡ 0 such
that the profits ppm  c1qDppmq of a monopolist with marginal costs c1 are strictly
increasing in pm on the domain rc1, c2   εs. We can then continue as in the previous
case. If c2   p2 ¤ p1, then there is p
1
1 P pc2, p2q such that pi1pp
1
1, p2q ¡ pi1pp1, p2q.
Either p2 ¤ pm and p
1
1 is obtained by slightly undercutting p2, or p2 ¡ pm and any
p11 P pc2, pmq will do. Now we can continue as before. If p1 R rp1, c2s and p2  c2, then
Firm 1 can profitably deviate to c2 to reach a strategy profile in P˜
. Because of the
legal restrictions on predatory pricing, we have covered all strategy profiles in P˜ zP˜ 
and thereby shown that P˜  satisfies asymptotic external stability.
Step 2. Let M  P˜  be a set satisfying deterrence of external deviations and asymptotic
external stability. Let us show that for every p1 P rp1, c2q it holds that pp1, c2q P M
implies pc2, c2q PM. Suppose pp1, c2q PM and pc2, c2q RM . By closedness of M , there
is ε1 ¡ 0 such that, for every ε P p0, ε1q, pc2ε, c2q RM . Take p
1
1  maxtpp1 c2q{2, c2
ε1{2u, then pp11, c2q P fpp1, c2q, so pp
1
1, c2q P M . Given that p
1
1 ¡ c2  ε
1, we obtain a
contradiction.
Step 3. Let M  P˜  be a set satisfying deterrence of external deviations and asymptotic
external stability. Let us show that if pc2, c2q P M , then, for every p1 P rp1, c2q, we
have pp1, c2q P M . This follows from the fact that, for every p1 P pp1, c2q, pi1pp1, c2q ¡
pi1pc2, c2q and the fact that M is closed.
Step 4. We are now ready to show that P˜  is an MSS. First of all, by Step 1 it satisfies
deterrence of external deviations and asymptotic external stability. So if P˜  is not an
MSS, it should violate minimality. This means that there is a proper subset M of P˜ 
that also satisfies deterrence of external deviations and asymptotic external stability.
The set M either contains pc2, c2q or it is a subset of rp1, c2q  tc2u. If M contains
pc2, c2q then, by Step 3, it should contain rp1, c2q  tc2u and therefore be equal to P˜
,
a contradiction with M being a proper subset of P˜ . If M is a subset of P˜ ztpc2, c2qu,
then by Step 2, it should contain pc2, c2q, a contradiction.
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Step 5. Finally we show that P˜  is the unique MSS. Let M be an MSS. We show that P˜ XM 
H. Towards a contradiction, suppose that P˜  XM  H. Then, for all p1 P P˜ , there
is p2 P M such that p2 P f8pp1q. Given that P˜  is closed and p2 R P˜ , there is ε ¡ 0
such that Bεpp
2qX P˜   H, where Bεpp
2q  tp P P˜ | dpp, p2q   εu. By definition of f8,
there is k P N and p P P˜ such that p P fkpp1q and p P Bεpp2q. By a k-fold application
of deterrence of external deviations, it holds that p P P˜ , so p P Bεpp
2q X P˜  and we
have obtained a contradiction. Consequently, it holds that P˜  XM  H.
Step 6. If M contains pc2, c2q, then, by Step 3, M should also contain P˜
ztpc2, c2qu, so P˜
 M
and by minimality P˜   M . If M contains an element of P˜ ztpc2, c2qu, then, by Step
2, it should also contain pc2, c2q and, by Step 3, also P˜
ztpc2, c2qu. Again, we obtain
P˜  M and by minimality P˜  M .
4 Discussion
We have provided a complete characterization of the Myopic Stable Set for two versions of
the Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric marginal costs. Despite the popularity of Bertrand
competition, the set of Nash equilibria has not been fully characterized and, without a
restriction to undominated strategies, even no equivalence of equilibrium payoffs has been
established.
For our solution concept, we obtain a unique set-valued prediction both when predatory
pricing is allowed and when it is forbidden by law. A clean solution to a game with such a
complex set of Nash equilibria boosts the appeal of the Myopic Stable Set.
Another implication of our results is that when predatory pricing is forbidden, the market
price is predicted to be weakly lower than in Nash equilibria in undominated strategies.
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